Rail/navigation
Search criteria
Implemented or comparable safety improvement
Not implemented, no further measures planned (closed)
Not implemented, specific implementation pending (open)
Partially implemented or specific implementation is planned (open)
Partially implemented, no further measures planned (closed)
Unassigned status for older safety recommendations
Within the period of 90 days after the publication
Data found: 177
Implemented or comparable safety improvement
Not implemented, no further measures planned (closed)
Not implemented, specific implementation pending (open)
Partially implemented or specific implementation is planned (open)
Partially implemented, no further measures planned (closed)
Unassigned status for older safety recommendations
Within the period of 90 days after the publication| Number Publication date Form of transport Type of incident |
Recommendation | Stage of the implementation | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
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21 11.09.2012 
Fire |
An independent company should be commissioned to check the electrical control system of the motors and its protection. |
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Details (PDF) |
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20 30.04.2013
Fire |
The four electric motors of the air conditioning system on the roof of this vehicle type should be serviced regularly. This maintenance should take into account the fact that the electric motors are exposed to a significant extent to the effects of the weather such as heat, cold and air pollution. |
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Details (PDF) |
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28 02.05.2013 
Accident at work |
In depth instructions and directives must ensure that the necessary attention is paid by private companies to the specific dangers in the railway sector. |
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Details (PDF) |
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17 02.05.2013 
Irregularity without direc hazard |
Support 17 should not be constructed in the same position owing to the geotechnical conditions (depth of rock, poor material characteristics of the unconsolidated rock, questionable stability of the slope) |
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Details (PDF) |
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18 02.05.2013
Irregularity without direc hazard |
If support 17 were to be rebuilt in the same position, the provision of measures to protect against sliding snow should be examined. The foundation and the support should be dimensioned to cope with the forces due to sliding snow. |
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Details (PDF) |
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30 18.06.2013
Serious incident |
The SAIB recommends that the “open position indicators" FB1-2 and FC1-2 be equipped with Eurobalises. |
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Details (PDF) |
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29 04.07.2013
Accident at work |
Die SUST empfiehlt ein schnelles Umsetzen der von den SBB vorgesehenen Massnahmen und Kontrollen auf den Baustellen durch Audits von SBB und BAV. |
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Details (PDF) |
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33 15.08.2013
Accident involving persons |
It must be examined whether the accidental suspension of objects on the chair can be prevented by design changes. |
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Details (PDF) |
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34 22.08.2013
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
A system for monitoring the minimum number of driving hours should be introduced which allows traceability of the completed driving time. |
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Details (PDF) |
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31 12.11.2013
Accident involving persons |
The wearing of backpacks on backs during travel on chairlifts must be forbidden, with warning signs. |
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Details (PDF) |
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32 12.11.2013
Accident involving persons |
It must be examined whether, by moving the seating position of the supervisor inside the office to the right, the overview of the monitored area can be optimised for both alighting and arriving skiers. |
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Details (PDF) |
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27 28.11.2013
Incident involving dangerous goods |
The logistics for the refilling and exchange of gas tanks with a capacity of 300 litres should be amended so that directive SBB D-I 50026 can be complied with. |
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Details (PDF) |
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37 06.12.2013
Collision on uncontrolled level crossing |
The FOT should require that this rail crossing for pedestrians is protected by signals or mechanisms which ensure that it can be crossed and used safely (Annex 5, Art. 37b of the Rail Ordinance). |
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Details (PDF) |
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35 19.12.2013
Collision on controlled level crossing |
The Horn side of the level crossing is to be equipped with an additional drive system with a barrier. As a result, in addition to the short time of the flashing warning light, the hazardous travel distance between the barriers could also be reduced. At least for trucks, this would prevent the barriers reaching their final position, because they would be resting on the truck and so no clearance for a train would be issued |
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Details (PDF) |
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60 04.03.2014
Collision: train-train |
Instruct staff in the emergency shutdown of overhead lines before the remote control of stations has been completely centralised (occasional activity for a dispatcher) and while the emergency shutdown of overhead lines remains functional. |
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Details (PDF) |
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61 04.03.2014
Collision: train-train |
Revise the wording and the stages of the train departure process so it can be applied unambiguously. |
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Details (PDF) |
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59 04.03.2014
Collision: train-train |
When setting priorities for equipping stations with the Euro-ZUB train control system, more weight should be given to stations where trains meet only occasionally, and account should be taken of human factors such as the dangers of routinisation, job stress, train movement, duty rotas. |
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Details (PDF) |
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58 01.07.2014
Collision: train-train |
Granges-Marnand station is to be equipped with the Euro-ZUB train control system in accordance with the guidelines of SBB regulations I 20027 dated 1.2.2012 |
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Details (PDF) |
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39 09.07.2014
Derailment of train or tram |
In consideration of the difference between the reference coupling condition accepted by Siemens for the lowlevel doubledecker wagon project (2x5 turns) and the SBB coupling regulations for modern passenger cars (2x3 turns), the STSB is advising the FOT to uniformly regulate the regulations con-cerning grooves. |
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Details (PDF) |
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43 13.08.2014
Collision: train-train |
During training of locomotive personnel the special character of the operation of the controller and driver’s brake valve of the De 4/4 should be dealt with repeatedly, so that lessons can be learnt from this accident |
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Details (PDF) |
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44 13.08.2014
Collision: train-train |
In the operating instructions for goods railcar De 4/4 321, the effects of the rapid braking position of the driver’s brake valve should be described |
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Details (PDF) |
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42 13.08.2014
Collision: train-train |
The visibility of the position of the De 4/4 controller should be improved, for example by removing the metal strip and highlighting the position indicator in white. |
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Details (PDF) |
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38 09.09.2014
Collision: train-shunting |
The FOT should examine whether the individual switch set-ting facility present in the system should be applied when setting a shunting route using the Iltis user interface, on an installation without dwarf signals. |
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Details (PDF) |
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57 14.10.2014
Derailment of train or tram |
The railway companies should include in their trains only those wagons which are listed in their rolling stock register. The train preparer should examine with the aid of appropriate documents whether the vehicles making up the train are certificated for transportation by the responsible railway operator (safety certificate with vehicle list in the form of an excerpt from the rolling stock register). |
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Details (PDF) |
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56 21.10.2014
Derailment of train or tram |
Wagons which have been out of service for some time should be included in a train only after a technical inspection by a suitably trained train preparer (a technical inspector) or an appropriate technical manager of a railway operator. |
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Details (PDF) |
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47 10.12.2014
Derailment of train or tram |
During internal training, dispatchers should be made aware of the great value of reports by drivers relating to damage/ incidents on the track. |
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Details (PDF) |
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46 10.12.2014
Derailment of train or tram |
The necessary intervals for grinding the rails should be examined as a function of the load on the section as well as the permitted speed. |
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Details (PDF) |
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45 10.12.2014
Derailment of train or tram |
The time interval between ultrasound measurements on sections subjected to heavy loads should be examined. |
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Details (PDF) |
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65 11.12.2014
Accident involving persons |
In view of the increase in road and rail traffic, the urban section of the LEB should be moved into a tunnel. |
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Details (PDF) |
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66 11.12.2014
Accident involving persons |
Until the urban section of the rail line has been moved into a tunnel, pedestrian traffic lights should be installed, preventing pedestrians from crossing the public transport lane when a train is approaching. |
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Details (PDF) |
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77 18.03.2015
Other |
The transport company’s safety management system should be adapted to include the risk control process and the determination of staff skills. |
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Details (PDF) |
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70 18.03.2015
Collision of train with obstruction |
SESA recommends that OFT should adapt the Ordinance on Activities Crucial to Safety in the Railways Sector (OASF) in order to state in it that when an individual suffering from an illness is receiving medical treatment that is incompatible with the exercising of a safety function, that individual must immediately inform the medical advisor. The latter must rule whether temporary incapacity to drive trains during the period when he is under medication must be declared. |
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Details (PDF) |
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69 18.03.2015
High-voltage accident |
Volume 178, ‘Instructions for drivers of lifting platform wagons’ from regulation R 402.4, ‘Regulation on the training of drivers of small engines and road vehicles’ should be reviewed and republished. |
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Details (PDF) |
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78 18.03.2015
Other |
Shunting movements on open track should be allocated using a De-bicode to an RU that possesses a network access operating licence. |
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Details (PDF) |
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68 18.03.2015
High-voltage accident |
When working at heights, technical dependence should be created in lifting platforms by not making a locking key for lifting the platform available until an earthing rod on the wagon is attached to the overhead line. |
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Details (PDF) |
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76 18.03.2015
Other |
Taking into account its operating concept, engine Tm III no. 98 85 0232 530-7 should be equipped with a train operation control system. |
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Details (PDF) |
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71 18.03.2015
Collision of train with obstruction |
SESA recommends that OFT should adapt the Ordinance on Activities Crucial to Safety in the Railways Sector (OASF) so that medical data gathered on individuals covered by the aforementioned ordinance further to various stipulated examinations should be centralised with the medical advisor who signed the most recent medical fitness examination. |
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Details (PDF) |
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85 12.05.2015
Derailment during shunting |
Given that some routes cannot be set completely and in these cases clearance is given for partial routes, the Federal Transport Office should examine whether the risk of derailment or collision is acceptable for the operational use of the seven SpDrS-SBB systems. |
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Details (PDF) |
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52 11.06.2015
Collision of road vehicles |
Work carried out on safety components must apply the two-man rule. Work must be documented and confirmed by the signature of those involved. |
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Details (PDF) |
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50 11.06.2015
Other |
In the driver’s cab of the two-way excavator, a table should be displayed with the permitted unbraked and braked trailer loads and the relevant inclines. |
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Details (PDF) |
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51 11.06.2015
Collision of road vehicles |
All work carried out on safety components must be in accordance with the operating instructions. Where the operating instructions are unclear, the transport company should clarify them with the manufacturer. |
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Details (PDF) |
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49 11.06.2015
Other |
A note should be displayed in the driver’s cabin explaining that operation of the parking brake immediately lowers the wheels with tyres. |
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Details (PDF) |
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55 11.06.2015
Collision of road vehicles |
The push rods should be examined for dimensional accuracy. In parti-cular, the dimensions 70 mm +/-0.1 mm and 129 mm +0/-0.2 mm are directly relevant to safety and must be adhered to. Push rods that do not conform to these dimensions must be replaced. |
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Details (PDF) |
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53 11.06.2015
Collision of road vehicles |
The pull-off force of the clamp should be measured using an appropriate device that connects to the clamp in the rope plane. |
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Details (PDF) |
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48 11.06.2015
Other |
On identical two way excavators, rocker control item 70 and rocker switch item 44 should be fitted with additional protection to prevent accidental actuation. |
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Details (PDF) |
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54 11.06.2015
Collision of road vehicles |
The positions of clamps no. 37 and no. 38 before the incident should be permanently marked on the haul rope. This area of the haul rope should be inspected visually for external damage at the regular resetting of the clamps. In addition, clamps should no longer be affixed to this stretch of the haul rope. At the next magnetoinductive rope testing, the rope testing centre must be informed of the incident. |
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Details (PDF) |
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82 25.08.2015
Collision on controlled level crossing |
The STSB recommends that the FOT ensure engine drivers are reminded to use rapid brake application rather than full brake application in emergency situations. |
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Details (PDF) |
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67 25.08.2015
Collision: train-train |
The FOT should arrange for stations with the same or similar operating conditions to be equipped with departure hindrance function. |
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Details (PDF) |
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41 06.10.2015
Serious incident |
The FOT should arrange for the shunting locomotive in question to be fitted with train control. |
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Details (PDF) |
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40 06.10.2015
Serious incident |
The FOT should examine how simple means can be added to prevent shunting movements on this stretch of track being confused with a train journey. |
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Details (PDF) |
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86 10.11.2015
Derailment of train or tram |
SESE recommends that OFT should, through the certification body, take immediate corrective action regarding the process of mounting axle box bearings in the ECM accredited maintenance workshop. |
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Details (PDF) |
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87 10.11.2015
Derailment of train or tram |
SESE recommends that OFT, through the certification body, should undertake immediate corrective measures regarding the process of mounting axle box bearings in the ECM accredited maintenance workshop. |
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Details (PDF) |
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89 10.11.2015
Runaway vehicle |
On a steeply inclined line, complete inertia braking weight of the train obtained by the braking systems independent of the air brake must be ensured. An incorrect indication of the independent braking weight values of the air brake on a wagon may lead to dangerous operating conditions and constitutes a safety deficit. The immobilisation braking weight value of 2 t of control car no. 51 referred to in the TRAVYS DE-PCT is incorrect. |
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Details (PDF) |
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88 10.11.2015
Runaway vehicle |
SESE recommends that OFT should adapt the pneumatic installation of the TRAVYS and MBC engines concerned in order to ensure at all times the recharging of the carriage’s supply duct – in the event of triggering caused by one or other of the safety systems – by replacing the A14 solenoid valve with BV solenoid valves. SESE recommends that OFT adapts the pneumatic system of the TRAVYS and MBC motor carriages concerned in order to ensure at all times the recharging of the carriage’s supply duct in the event of actuation caused by one or other safety system, by replacing the A14 electrovalve with BV electrovalves. |
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Details (PDF) |
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90 05.02.2016 
Fire |
The FOT should ensure that during the assembly of electrical components on craft no impermissible forces can occur at terminal connections. |
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Details (PDF) |
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92 28.04.2016
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
The FOT should ensure that all people who are possibly involved in work on the line are trained in this regard and, where necessary, should provide refresher courses. |
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Details (PDF) |
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91 28.04.2016
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
The FOT (Federal Office of Transport) should develop solutions at the levels of technology, process and people that will reduce the risk of collisions during shunting operations with a ground signal displaying ‘drive with care’. |
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Details (PDF) |
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97 22.09.2016
Collision: train-train |
The FOT should increasingly concern itself with issues relating to human factors and strive to flesh out a concept for training all parties involved regarding teamwork in the driver’s cab that takes issues such as verbal and non-verbal communication, the impact of hierarchies, qualifications and experience into consideration. |
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Details (PDF) |
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99 22.09.2016
Collision: train-train |
The FOT should endeavour to ensure that all situations, even those which already existed before the introduction of the change-in-use process, are assessed to determine whether departure prevention is required and to be supplemented. |
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Details (PDF) |
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94 22.09.2016
Derailment of train or tram |
The STSB recommends that the FOT promotes the use of a system for measuring the dynamic coefficient, compiles a standardised technical basis for defined limits, and also compiles a catalogue of faults, thereby allowing transport companies to arrange appropriate inspection measures for incoming notifications. |
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Details (PDF) |
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102 22.09.2016
Collision: train-train |
The FOT should audit the process used by the infrastructure operators for determining and checking signal locations for whether all signals meet the level of visibility, correlation of signal and track as well as perceptible light intensity required by the crew in all light conditions. |
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Details (PDF) |
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101 22.09.2016
Collision: train-train |
The FOT should effect that, after the driver’s cab has been started up and until information on the infrastructure has been received, the speed is monitored to ensure it is at a level at which it still remains possible to stop the train before the danger point with a full application of the emergency brakes by the train control system. |
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Details (PDF) |
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93 22.09.2016
Derailment of train or tram |
To decrease the risk of damage caused to wagons during a derailment, the STSB recommends that the FOT has protruding measuring bars (track assurances), which are still built into the edge of the track, removed. |
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Details (PDF) |
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96 22.09.2016
Derailment of train or tram |
The STSB recommends that the FOT amends the ECM regulations with regards to the certification of the bodies commissioned to carry out maintenance so that certifications and audits of the workshops responsible for maintenance (ECM system’s function ‘d’) can no longer be delegated to third-party organisations, but instead fall under the responsibility of the national regulators. |
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Details (PDF) |
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95 22.09.2016
Derailment of train or tram |
The STSB recommends that the FOT adapts the technical specifications for the inspection of leaf springs as part of maintenance work, so that an additional inspection, besides checking the spring strength, is stipulated that enables possible notches and fine cracks to be detected in the individual leaf springs. |
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Details (PDF) |
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98 22.09.2016
Collision: train-train |
The FOT should analyse the guidelines on signal reporting with regards to their safety relevance and implementation, with a special focus on whether the relevant actions are covered explicitly. |
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Details (PDF) |
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1 22.09.2016
Collision: train-train |
For work scheduling at SBB Passenger Services, the defined time allocations for essential preparatory and finishing work should be evaluated with regards to their safetyrelated effects and adapted accordingly. | Details (PDF) | |
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2 22.09.2016
Collision: train-train |
SBB Passenger Services should effect that the initial ‘vocational gesture’ for departure is reviewed and purged of matters that are not relevant to safety. | Details (PDF) | |
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100 22.09.2016
Collision: train-train |
The FOT should ensure, that, as part of the changeover to the ETCS L1LS system, departure prevention that affects all trains is realised by appropriate means. |
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Details (PDF) |
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105 07.10.2016
Derailment of train or tram |
The STSB recommends that the FOT has axles with non-compliant keyways replaced. |
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Details (PDF) |
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104 18.10.2016
Accident involving persons |
The FOT should ensure that the cantons train game keepers and wardens about proper conduct on and around tracks and ensure the use of high-vis equipment. |
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Details (PDF) |
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107 04.11.2016
Derailment during shunting |
The FOT should examine the interaction between the processes for route preparation, clearance and speeds in the areas of non-centralised switches, and adapt it where necessary. |
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Details (PDF) |
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106 04.11.2016
Derailment during shunting |
The FOT should take measures to make it easier to identify the setting of a switch embedded into the ground. |
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Details (PDF) |
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72 06.12.2016
Derailment during shunting |
This contamination led to electrical isolation of the wheel from the rail and thus to a clear signal for the section of the rail in the area of set of points 11. On running over set of points 11, these points were switched back under the wagons because of the way the system operates. |
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Details (PDF) |
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110 03.02.2017
Derailment of train or tram |
The FOT should ensure that attention is paid to the occurrence and possible consequences of longitudinal forces within trains with disparate trailer loads throughout the train composition. Where possible, heavy wagons should be attached in front of wagons with lower axle load. |
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Details (PDF) |
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111 02.03.2017
Derailment of train or tram |
The FOT should check guidelines for securing interior panels of train carriages and amend them, where necessary, so that these panels cannot come loose in the event of severe shaking. |
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Details (PDF) |
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83 21.03.2017
Fire |
The FOT should examine standards for monitoring electric motors with regard to separation from the power supply in the event of technical problems, and amend them if necessary. |
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Details (PDF) |
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113 03.04.2017
Runaway vehicle |
The STSB recommends that the FOT separate the circuits of the door closure warning system from those of the fail-safe. |
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Details (PDF) |
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115 03.04.2017
Runaway vehicle |
The STSB recommends that the FOT study the possibility of stipulating periodic guidance for engineers in the first months of activity following the end of their training. |
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Details (PDF) |
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114 03.04.2017
Runaway vehicle |
The STSB recommends that the FOT study the possibility of refining the current personality requirements for the admission of locomotive engineers, and to integrate these requirements into the current psychological assessment. |
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Details (PDF) |
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112 03.04.2017
Runaway vehicle |
The STSB recommends that the FOT, within the framework of training driving staff, plan specific training modules on braking and door closure for as long as these vehicles remain in service or as long as these peculiarities remain. |
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Details (PDF) |
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118 24.04.2017
Fire |
The FOT should ensure that railcars with a BBC high- or low-voltage tap changer are fitted with a pressure monitor for the tap changer. |
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Details (PDF) |
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116 01.05.2017
Derailment during shunting |
The FOT should make certain that technical means in the screw couplings ensure that no inadmissible buffering forces can develop when longer freight wagons travel on track curves with small radii. |
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Details (PDF) |
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117 01.05.2017
Derailment during shunting |
The FOT should ensure that the minimum track curvature is listed in the operating instructions for railway sidings and that the operational measures for travelling on the tracks concerned are regulated. |
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Details (PDF) |
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103 23.05.2017
Collision of vehicle with obstruction |
As part of its supervisory activity, the FOT should examine whether the cableway companies sufficiently assume their responsibility for staff training and adequate duty-roster planning. |
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Details (PDF) |
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122 09.06.2017
Runaway vehicle |
The FOT should examine the minimum requirement for the braking system of service wagons with regard to the risks of all possible uses and adapt it if and where necessary. |
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Details (PDF) |
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124 09.06.2017
Runaway vehicle |
The FOT should ensure that an identification label displaying vehicle approval is affixed to all service vehicles. |
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Details (PDF) |
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119 09.06.2017
Collision: train-shunting |
The FOT should examine, whether: – The current guidelines for assessing the risks posed on railway tracks by shunting movements are sufficient. – The companies carry out standardised recurring assessments of such situations following a change in operational processes. |
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Details (PDF) |
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120 09.06.2017
Accident involving persons |
The FOT should ensure that the Be 556 fleet is equipped with an effective anti-trap facility which complies with approved technology and that the final positions of the doors and running boards are registered as being safe and definitely closed. |
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Details (PDF) |
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121 09.06.2017
Accident involving persons |
The FOT should examine if a similar safety deficit exists with other vehicle types and take appropriate measures to eliminate them. |
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Details (PDF) |
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125 09.06.2017
Fire |
The STSB recommends that the FOT transmit to the Federal Roads Office (FEDRO), which carries out type-approval testing pursuant to Article 12 of the Federal Act of 19 December 1958 on Road Traffic, as amended 1 October 2016, the following safety recommendation: At the type-approval test, particular attention should be paid so that no component made of synthetic material be installed in the engine compartment, without adequate protective equipment, close to an element that generates a significant level of heat. |
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Details (PDF) |
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123 09.06.2017
Runaway vehicle |
The FOT should examine whether the current rules regarding unbraked vehicles in shunting service should be limited to unavoidable situations or whether additional rules might be necessary. |
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Details (PDF) |
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73 13.07.2017
Derailment of train or tram |
The Federal Office of Transport should ensure that all wheel discs on identically constructed vehicles (1964–1968 series) are replaced. |
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Details (PDF) |
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75 13.07.2017
Derailment of train or tram |
The Federal Office of Transport should ensure that the maximum permitted speed through curves is reset to the original value in order to reduce the loading on wheel discs in curves. |
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Details (PDF) |
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74 13.07.2017
Derailment of train or tram |
The Federal Office of Transport should ensure that a magnetic particle test is arranged for all wheel discs on the other vehicles. |
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Details (PDF) |
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128 07.08.2017
Derailment of train or tram |
The STSB recommends that the FOT have TransN railcars BDe 4/4 nos. 2 to 5 taken out of service until all the axles currently in service have been replaced. |
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Details (PDF) |
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126 07.08.2017
Derailment of train or tram |
The STSB recommends that the FOT, when ordering replacement axles, carries out dimensioning calculations on these axles. |
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Details (PDF) |
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127 07.08.2017
Derailment of train or tram |
The STSB recommends that the FOT have the TransN safety management system supplemented to include the process of obsolescence management for safety components of rolling stock. |
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Details (PDF) |
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129 12.12.2017
Runaway vehicle |
The FOT should prompt the braking concept on shunting tractors of an identical type to be adjusted so that the parking brake is sufficiently effective at all times. |
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Details (PDF) |
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130 12.12.2017
Runaway vehicle |
The FOT should examine if there are other vehicles with a similar parking brake design and propose to the respective railway companies that they develop guidelines for the parking brake’s adjustment and the assessment of its braking effect in these vehicles. |
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Details (PDF) |
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109 16.01.2018
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
The FOT should carry out an in-depth study of the conflicts between applicable regulations and operational reality, and implement appropriate measures. The study should cover the following topics: A) How do shunting movement accidents rank (frequency and extent) in comparison to all of the other accidents in which railway companies have an influence? To what extent is action required concerning risks and the potential development of risks (risk acceptance)? B) Are there safety deficits in shunting operations due to the centralisation of the signal box operation? C) In which areas does the day-to-day behaviour of personnel differ from the rules for shunting movements in facilities with dwarf signals as stipulated in the transport service regulations? D) What is the impact of proper behaviour during shunting movements in facilities with dwarf signals on operations? What need for action can be derived from it? E) What measures can be implemented to eliminate any conflict between proper behaviour during shunting movements in facilities with dwarf signals and undisrupted operations? F) What would a safety net for carriages in shunting service that has a similar effect to that of the train protection system need to look like? G) What opportunities and risks are involved in an increased exchange of information between the personnel involved from traffic and infrastructure? H) Do additional aids to ensure a consistent level of information amongst all involved, traffic and infrastructure, make sense and how must they be designed? |
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Details (PDF) |
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133 08.05.2018
Derailment of train or tram |
The FOT should ensure that all axels of the same type as those of Bm 6/6 should be subjected to complete non-destructive testing |
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Details (PDF) |
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9 15.05.2018
Collision of train with obstruction |
Target group: SBB, BLS, SOB In order to reduce the risks associated with recommissioning a track section in working areas to allow a train through, SBB should give preference in its work planning to operational measures, such as requiring the train to join a different track from the one in the timetable. This means that the automatic monitoring systems, which are still active, are put to the best operational use. | Details (PDF) | |
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131 15.05.2018
Collision of train with obstruction |
The STSB advises the FOT to cover in the FDV the issue of a road-rail vehicle joining a track at a track section equipped with a clear track detection device in the form of an axle counter system. |
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Details (PDF) |
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11 02.07.2018
Runaway vehicle |
Target group: Railway transport companies that deliver and collect goods wagons in sidings. The STSB recommends that the railway transport companies concerned check whether the contractual regulations are also being broken in practice in other sidings. If necessary, the shunting teams should be made aware of this issue so that the contractual partners can be required to comply with these regulations. | Details (PDF) | |
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12 02.07.2018
Runaway vehicle |
Target group: Sidings operators operating their own shunting service on their tracks. The STSB recommends that the siding operators concerned ensure that all shunting staff have completed the appropriate training and examinations. | Details (PDF) | |
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10 02.07.2018
Runaway vehicle |
Target group: Railway transport companies that deliver and collect goods wagons in sidings. Wagons that run away are a considerable safety risk. The STSB therefore recommends that the railway companies concerned check whether this safety deficit also exists in other shunting teams. If necessary, training and monitoring of practical implementation should be improved. | Details (PDF) | |
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132 19.08.2018
Fire |
The FOT should ask owners of traction units with a tap changer type NO 32/4 or tap changers with an identical operating principle to take measures to prevent the occurrence or spread of a fire after a tap changer explosion due to the release of flammable liquids or gases from leaks, or to reduce the effects. |
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Details (PDF) |
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134 18.09.2018
Collision: train-shunting |
The STSB recommends that the FOT discontinue technical connection monitoring, such as the control tone, for safetyrelevant communication connections unless it is ensured that these are dependent on active action by the operator. |
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Details (PDF) |
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14 18.09.2018
Collision: train-shunting |
Target group: Train drivers, shunting supervisors, dispatchers, personnel at workplaces. On training and development courses, train drivers, shunting supervisors, dispatchers and personnel at workplaces, in particular safety managers and safety heads, should receive an explanation of the difference and the meaning of “securing” and “closing” tracks, based on the FDV and the Implementing Provisions to FDV Infrastructure. This is to ensure that these terms are applied correctly. | Details (PDF) | |
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13 18.09.2018
Collision: train-shunting |
Target group: Infrastructure companies The role and tasks of safety management, in particular the perception of safety responsibility in the planning and implementation of workplaces, should be reviewed. This should take account of aspects such as the burden on personnel and the monitoring of safety measures | Details (PDF) | |
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16 16.10.2018
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
Target group: Infrastructure operator SBB The STSB proposes that the infrastructure operator verify whether the centralised management process for infrastructure maintenance vehicles, which was introduced in July 2017, meets expectations in terms of availability and flexibility, and adapts the process if necessary. | Details (PDF) | |
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15 16.10.2018
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
Target group: Infrastructure operators To ensure that the safety plan and the risk assessment derived from it correspond to the actual status of the onsite work, the STSB proposes that infrastructure operators regularly check the plan’s suitability. | Details (PDF) | |
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136 16.10.2018
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
The STSB recommends that the FOT ask the infrastructure managers to draw up an inventory of non-approved rolling stock for rail-bound driving currently in their possession, classify these vehicles and then submit an application for approval of the vehicles in accordance with the FOT guideline “Railway Vehicle Approval” (Annex 4, Service Vehicles). Any restrictions on the scope of use should be indicated in the approval and an appropriate label should be affixed to the vehicle. |
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Details (PDF) |
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17 16.10.2018
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
Target group: Infrastructure operator SBB Infrastructure operator SBB should supplement document K 001.1 with provisions on a verification and release system for issuing instructions. | Details (PDF) | |
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135 23.10.2018
Irregularity with hazard |
With regard to the possible factors that could cause the clearance gauge to be violated, the STSB recommends that the FOT carry out a risk assessment as a basis for checking and/or determining the need for immediate measures and initiating their implementation. In particular, it should also be clarified whether tank containers of the same type that travel through Switzerland have comparable defects. |
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Details (PDF) |
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137 18.12.2018
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
The FOT should examine whether the regulations which apply to marshalling movements on closed tracks on downhill gradients are adequate and, if necessary, issue supplementary regulations. |
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Details (PDF) |
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18 18.12.2018
Collision: shunting with obstruction |
Target group: Carlo Vanoli AG A comprehensible notice should be visible on locomotive Am 847 909-9 saying that the brake, which only affects the locomotive, behaves differently to other standard gauge traction vehicles. | Details (PDF) | |
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138 11.06.2019
Collision on controlled level crossing |
In order to increase safety at level crossings, the STSB has advised the Federal Roads Office (FEDRO) in conjunction with the Fund for Road Safety (FRS) [Fonds für Verkehrssicherheit (FVS)] and the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) to identify and implement appropriate measures to make road users more aware of the dangers at level crossings. Particular emphasis was to be placed on road user education and pedestrian behaviour. |
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Details (PDF) |
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140 16.07.2019
Derailment of train or tram |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should examine measures and specifications to ensure that lubrication of the rail flank is ensured at all times in areas with high dynamic stress track geometries. |
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Details (PDF) |
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139 16.07.2019
Derailment of train or tram |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should examine measures and specifications for the gap between stock rails and switch rail and ensure that the gap dimension qe remains restricted under a running train so that a critical situation for derailment does not arise. |
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Details (PDF) |
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142 20.08.2019
Accident at work |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) ask train operators to have the door limit switch system of EW IV to be modified so that the red indicator lamps display the correct door status to the engine driver. |
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Details (PDF) |
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141 20.08.2019
Accident at work |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) asks vehicle keeper to replace the current system for deactivating the anti-trap protection on the EW IV by a reliable system. |
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Details (PDF) |
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145 27.08.2019
Serious incident |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should lay down mandatory requirements for persons with safety-relevant duties so that their initial training and periodic professional development covers ways of thinking and behaving when dealing with disruption, similar to the position in aviation with TRM training. |
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Details (PDF) |
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146 27.08.2019
Serious incident |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should examine whether the procedure, whereby items are communicated subject to a receipt and forms are filled in, meets the objective of an unambiguous unequivocal agreement between the parties involved which meets both the time requirements and the safety aspects at all times and does not entail additional safety risks of its own. This examination should take account in particular of the possible means of communications available today. |
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Details (PDF) |
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21 03.09.2019
Derailment of train or tram |
Target group: Infrastructure operators After a new switch rail has been installed, an initial quantity of lubricant should be applied to the rail manually until the wheel flanges have spread a sufficiently large grease film over the switch rail. | Details (PDF) | |
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144 03.09.2019
High-voltage accident |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should continue its audits and checks/operational inspections, with the focus on safety at the workplace, and examine additional findings and measures of the infrastructure manager in relation to effectiveness and sustainability. The focus should be placed on the following aspects in particular: • checking the previous processes such as: risk analysis, safety plan, construction work regulations, job order and documentation, and the job handover and instructions to the employee doing the work, and inspecting the work site. • organisation of training and professional development courses for employees on the work preparation process and monitoring them regularly for quality assurance purposes. |
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Details (PDF) |
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20 03.09.2019
Derailment of train or tram |
Target group: SBB-I and GIOS SBB-I and GIOS should examine whether the current locations for radio switching on the line between Basel Badischer Bahnhof and Basel SBB or Basel RB respectively are appropriate, and effect changes if necessary. | Details (PDF) | |
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143 03.09.2019
Derailment of train or tram |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should bring the report and the safety advice it contains to the notice of the German Federal Railways Authority (FRA) and ask the latter for its comments on the measures envisaged. |
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Details (PDF) |
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19 03.09.2019
Derailment of train or tram |
Target group: Infrastructure operators The infrastructure operators should examine the conditions under which route blocks of the cancelled train route can be used immediately after an emergency cancellation of the route, and take appropriate measures as necessary. | Details (PDF) | |
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148 04.02.2020
Irregularity with hazard |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) ask the CWA supplier to identify whether such parts are in service on other types of installations and then to provide evidence that the parts in service conform to the production drawings. |
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Details (PDF) |
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147 04.02.2020
Irregularity with hazard |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) inform the operators of similar installations of the defects on the Funitel in Crans-Montana, so that similar parts of their installations can be thoroughly inspected in order to detect possible construction defects in the guide carriages. |
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Details (PDF) |
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152 25.02.2020
Serious incident |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should examine whether the same procedure - ordering 'run at sight' - should always be used for the first journey after the signal is given that the track is clear, irrespective of the type of track vacancy detection system. |
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Details (PDF) |
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153 17.03.2020
Accident involving persons |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) urge the train operators to replace the 2nd generation rubber profile used on all affected vehicle types with a rubber profile that detects any obstacles in the door area and opens the door again to prevent persons and objects from getting trapped or knocked over. |
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Details (PDF) |
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154 17.03.2020
Accident involving persons |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) request the vehicle owners concerned to replace systems with an inactive anti-trap protection circuit, such as those installed on Eurocity passenger coaches, standard carriages IV and Intercity driving trailers, with a reliable system that also prevents hands from being trapped. |
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Details (PDF) |
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151 28.04.2020
Accident involving persons |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) require the TCP to introduce a resource management system that ensures that only suitably trained staff are employed for railway safety-related activities. |
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Details (PDF) |
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149 28.04.2020
Accident involving persons |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) ask the TPC to add provisions on full-track stops to their RSR-IPs. |
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Details (PDF) |
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150 28.04.2020
Accident involving persons |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) ensure that procedures and risk mitigation measures for exceptional stops on open track are addressed as part of the implementation of the TPC's safety management system (SMS). |
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Details (PDF) |
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155 15.09.2020
Vehicle fall |
For the operation of cableways with this or similar types of clamp and monitoring equipment, the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should require companies to provide evidence that blocked clamps can be reliably detected and vehicles with only partially closed clamps can be reliably identified and prevented from leaving the station. |
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Details (PDF) |
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156 15.09.2020
Vehicle fall |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should ascertain whether safety-relevant information from new findings is consistently passed on in the safety network between manufacturers, distributors, operators and supervisory authorities. |
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Details (PDF) |
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157 13.10.2020
Irregularity without direc hazard |
The STSB recommends that, in the development of centralised traffic management and widespread automation, the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) ensure that when humans are required in certain situations to take control of safety functions assigned to the system these functions automatically default to predefined substitute processes. |
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Details (PDF) |
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158 24.02.2021
Collision of train with obstruction |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) request the operators of trainsets of type RABe 515 to check and adjust the braking performance so that the trainsets achieve the braking performance values in the type approval in all operating situations. Alternatively, other measures should be taken to ensure that the trains are able to come to a standstill in time. |
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Details (PDF) |
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159 30.03.2021
Irregularity with hazard |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) instruct the lift operating company to conduct non-destructive testing of all the towers in the lift system and carry out any repairs needed to immediately correct any issues found. |
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Details (PDF) |
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160 11.05.2021
Derailment of train or tram |
The STSB recommends that the FOT adapt RTE 41500 (industry-specific maintenance regulations) so that non-destructive testing is thoroughly regulated, while at the same time recommending a complete inspection of the entire axle when changing wheels or tyres. |
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Details (PDF) |
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161 06.07.2021
Accident involving persons |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should examine the extent to which informing public transport users not to reach into closing door spaces can lead to fewer people falling or becoming trapped. It should ensure appropriate measures are implemented where necessary. |
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Details (PDF) |
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162 17.08.2021
Collision: shunting-shunting |
The STSB recommends that the FOT ask the SBB Infrastructure manager to take organisational measures to ensure that the work is coordinated between the various units when planning worksites in the same area at the same time. |
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Details (PDF) |
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163 17.08.2021
Collision: shunting-shunting |
The STSB recommends that, to ensure the safety of complex worksites, the FOT should require infrastructure managers to provide safety managers and site coordinators with a real-time graphical overview of the operating situation (in particular the status of track restrictions, track occupancy and established itineraries) for the area in which they are responsible for worksite safety. |
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Details (PDF) |
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167 31.08.2021
Incident involving dangerous goods |
In accordance with Article 26 paragraph 2 of Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety, the STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) forward the following safety recommendation to the national safety authority of the member state in which the wagons are registered (NSA-NL) and to the national safety authority of the member state in which the responsible ECM is based (NSA-FR): The STSB recommends that all Zacns series N-310-02 tank wagons with the HAW-H94 protective lining be removed from service and that the protective lining be inspected by an independent body. At the same time and in consideration of the inspection results, the STSB recommends clarifying whether other tank wagons with comparable protective linings may be affected and, if so, that appropriate measures be taken. |
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Details (PDF) |
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166 07.09.2021
Collision of ship with landing stage |
The Federal Office of Transport FOT should require the ship companies to train and test crew members in safety-relevant system failures and irregularities and suitable emergency procedures. Shipmasters should also have the opportunity to rehearse the procedures periodically so that they can be applied intuitively in the case of an incident. |
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Details (PDF) |
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164 07.09.2021
Collision of ship with landing stage |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should examine whether passenger ship control systems should be required to have a data recording system to record and store signals. |
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Details (PDF) |
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165 07.09.2021
Collision of ship with landing stage |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should require ship companies to develop and implement a safety management system. This should ensure that possible risks are identified, recorded and evaluated, and that required actions are defined and corrections are initiated. Collecting, distributing and monitoring the impact of safety-relevant information should be taken into particular account. |
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Details (PDF) |
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27 07.09.2021
Collision of ship with landing stage |
Target group: Ship companies Ship companies should systematically examine their timetable design for risks that may arise from time pressure, topology or encounters between vessels, and implement measures to reduce the risks. | Details (PDF) | |
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29 19.10.2021
Accident at work |
Target group: Cable car companies Cable car companies should ensure that personal protective equipment to prevent falls is used consistently when working at height, even in situations where, for example, guardrails offer partial protection against falls. | Details (PDF) | |
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168 19.10.2021
Accident at work |
In its supervisory activities, the Federal Office of Transport FOT should check whether the cable car companies have suitable operational solutions in place to ensure safety at work sites during operation. |
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Details (PDF) |
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28 19.10.2021
Accident at work |
Target group: Cable car companies Cable car companies should take the following action, ideally working together with their branch organisation: • Establish criteria to determine whether a work site may be set up near movable parts or moving vehicles; • Define measures for keeping employees safe and warning them during maintenance work carried out on installations that are in operation, in particular: - Determine how to set up shelters that allow work to be carried out during operation; - Determine which organisational or technical measures/means can be used to warn of approaching equipment; • Develop measures to maintain employees' awareness and so ensure ongoing safety improvements. | Details (PDF) | |
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169 21.12.2021
Collision: ship-ship |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should raise awareness in the inland navigation sector that an FMEA should also take into account the effects of both computer-based control failures and operator errors. The FOT should then check these points in the FMEA in the planning approval process. |
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Details (PDF) |
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171 21.12.2021
Collision: ship-ship |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should establish which data must be present and available in existing and new systems from a risk and safety perspective and ensure that data storage options are exploited. |
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Details (PDF) |
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30 21.12.2021
Collision: ship-ship |
Target group: Companies operating ships in which there is no handover between several control stands for rudder control or in which the control stands have equal rights in this respect. These companies should draw up written guidelines on the transfer or assumption of command among several shipmasters in order to ensure uniform behaviour irrespective of the individuals concerned, whereby only one control signal transmitter is operated at any one time. | Details (PDF) | |
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170 21.12.2021
Collision: ship-ship |
The Federal Office of Transport FOT should be active in appropriate bodies to ensure that requirements for computer-based control systems are established in the field of inland navigation to address safety-relevant issues relating to procurement, development, testing, maintenance and operation. |
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Details (PDF) |
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31 21.01.2022
Collision of train with obstruction |
Target group: BLS The BLS should introduce specifications on the increased use of the pneumatic brake in normal operation on RABe 515 multiple units so as to avoid brake pad glazing. | Details (PDF) | |
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32 08.03.2022
Collision: train-train |
Target group: MGB Taking into account the human, operational and technical factors, the MGB should analyse the risks and the operational necessity of dispatching car trains on track 71 with signal showing reduced distance (Aspect 6), and if necessary look at risk-reducing measures. | Details (PDF) | |
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172 17.05.2022
Collision of train with obstruction |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) submit the findings of this investigation to the EN 15152 standards committee so that they can be taken into account in any further developments of the standard. |
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Details (PDF) |
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173 24.05.2022
Accident involving persons |
In view of the amount of traffic on the level crossing at the Longeraie crossroads, and following the creation of a new pavement crossing the railway line to serve two public transport stops, this crossing does not meet the criteria for ensuring operational safety and preventing people from being put at risk when using it. The STSB recommends that the FOT secure this crossing by installing road and pedestrian barriers. |
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Details (PDF) |
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175 06.12.2022
Collision: train-train |
As part of its supervisory activities, the Federal Office of Transport should check whether the infrastructure managers and railway undertakings systematically document train control failures and draw conclusions from the reports received. |
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Details (PDF) |
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174 06.12.2022
Collision: train-train |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should examine to what extent the specifications can be adapted so that priority is given to preventing a ride being driven without a functional train control system. If journeys are nonetheless still necessary in such a situation, then measures to effectively reduce the resulting increased risk must be in place. |
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Details (PDF) |
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176 13.12.2022
Irregularity with hazard |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) have the geometric proportions of the adjustable driving pinion system on Adler and Fink multiple units modified. |
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Details (PDF) |
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178 13.12.2022
Irregularity with hazard |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) define a safety factor for the dimensioning of driving pinions in the implementing provisions to the Railways Ordinance (IP-RailO). |
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Details (PDF) |
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177 13.12.2022
Irregularity with hazard |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) review and, if necessary, adapt the concept for the bars Zentralbahn currently uses so that: • … unsprung head-to-head strikes cannot occur when exiting the rack rail system; • … there are never two pinions on a bar at the same time. |
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Details (PDF) |
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181 31.01.2023
Grounding |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should issue a requirement or check with supervisors that the training officers educate their shipmasters sufficiently and at the appropriate level on relevant human factors in the man-machine-environment system, specifically in the area of situational awareness. Similarly, the FOT should request evidence from training officers of how shipmasters train for and assess these human factors competencies in practical situations. |
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Details (PDF) |
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180 31.01.2023
Grounding |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should provide shipping companies with guidelines for their operating regulations. These should improve error resilience in the man-machine-environment system by ensuring the companies set down in writing, assess, develop, and provide training in standard operating procedures for a range of situations, based on a risk assessment. |
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Details (PDF) |
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182 04.04.2023
Collision: train-shunting |
Within the framework of safety monitoring, the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should review how all parties involved are provided with and instructed about operating licence conditions and restrictions relevant to the operation of construction service vehicles. The FOT should also review how compliance with such conditions and restrictions are checked in practice. |
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Details (PDF) |
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183 22.09.2023
Derailment of train or tram |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) initiate an extension of the measures defined in the first JNS Urgent Procedure in order to limit the risk to the wheelset of the BA 390 series during operation and maintenance. |
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Details (PDF) |
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184 22.09.2023
Derailment of train or tram |
The SESE recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) request that the ERA convene a JNS Procedure. |
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Details (PDF) |
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179 01.02.2024
Collision of road vehicles |
The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should ensure that manufacturers and operators of installations involving clamps with AK Type disc spring systems (AK 2, AK 2.1, AK 4, AK 4.1, AK 6 und AK 6.1) are made aware of the problem that occurred in Visperterminen and take appropriate action to check for and correct any faults. |
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Details (PDF) |
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185 26.03.2024
Failure of safety systems |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (OFT) ask MOB to check the magnetic braked weight values of all their vehicles and to adapt the table of braked weight values to be considered in the braking calculation mentioned in their IP-RSRs accordingly. |
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Details (PDF) |
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186 26.03.2024
Failure of safety systems |
The STSB recommends that the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) ask the MOB to adapt the procedures of its integrated management system (IMS) so that, when modifications are made to vehicles, it is clear who is responsible for categorising such modifications and ensuring that they are submitted to the FOT for vehicle approval. |
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Details (PDF) |
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187 26.03.2024
Failure of safety systems |
The STSB makes the following recommendation: During the approval process for non-interoperable vehicles, the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should ensure that the expert report takes account of all specific conditions, particularly with regard to the interaction between the various braking systems during operations. |
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Details (PDF) |
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