



Safety recommendation no. 162

Date of the publication	17.08.2021
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Safety deficit	<p>On 16 November 2020 at 02:33, a collision occurred on track 3 in Cully between a train engaged in a shunting movement, coming from an SBB Infrastructure Contact Lines worksite on the open track between Lutry and Cully, and another train at a standstill on track 3. The latter was supposed to continue its journey to an SBB Infrastructure Tracks worksite in Lutry, i.e. past the Contact Lines worksite. As a result of the impact, the stationary vehicles on track 3 were pushed back 25 metres. Two people were slightly injured. The rolling stock incurred extensive damage.</p> <p>The collision on track 3 at Cully station between the Contact Lines train and the Tracks train was caused by the former travelling at a speed unadapted to the visibility conditions and the ETCS signal showing 'Proceed with caution'. The train was unable to come to a halt before reaching the stationary vehicles.</p> <p>The following contributed to the incident:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• A lack of planning and coordination in preparing the works so that there was no agreed definition of the operating restrictions to be applied when working on the same site;• Failure to hire a site coordinator;• Failure to inform staff on the ground of the operating status, which would allow them to determine unequivocally the current track occupancy. <p>When several worksites are in operation in the same area and the same tracks have to be closed, a site coordinator must always be present, as stipulated in the safety guidelines drawn up in accordance with RTE 20100.</p> <p>Uncoordinated movements and non-uniform procedures are factors contributing to irregularities.</p> <p>The danger of such lack of coordination when planning works was previously highlighted in the report on the fatal accident at a worksite at Airolo station on 5 February 2019. The report on the endangerment of operations at Cully station on 15 November 2019 also highlighted a lack of planning and coordination in preparing the works, which meant there was no agreed definition of the operating restrictions to be applied.</p> <p>Following the report on that incident at Cully on 15 November 2019, Safety Advice No 25 was issued, as follows:</p> <p>To standardise working processes, where there are two engineering sites in the same area at the same time, SBB Infrastructure should ensure that the operators concerned coordinate with each other to plan and define common operating restrictions.</p> <p>This accident has once again highlighted the lack of planning and coordination in preparing the works so as to ensure an agreed definition of the operating restrictions to be applied when working on the same site.</p>

Safety recommendation

The STSB recommends that the FOT ask the SBB Infrastructure manager to take organisational measures to ensure that the work is coordinated between the various units when planning worksites in the same area at the same time.

Addressees	Bundesamt für Verkehr
Stage of the implementation	Implemented: The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) responds as follows: SBB AG, Infrastructure (SBBI) was asked for its response to the safety recommendation. The FOT notes that SBBI is aware of its responsibility for health and safety with regard to works across coordinated worksites, and that it has established or planned a range of measures to this effect. The FOT acknowledges the measures already implemented and those planned, and will continue to monitor the implementation and effectiveness of all processes and guidelines.
Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation	<u>Rapport final</u> <u>Rapport de première information</u>