



Safety recommendation no. 9

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Safety deficit	<p>On Tuesday, 14 November 2017, at around 04:20, SBB Cargo train no. 50772 from Lausanne collided with a road-rail excavator operating on Vevey station's track 2, which was closed. No one was injured.</p> <p>When lifting the closure of track 22 and points 12 and 13, the dispatcher also lifted the closure of track 2, even though the safety manager had not reported that this track was navigable. For this reason, the route of train no. 50722 was automatically adjusted by the signal box via track 2.</p> <p>The following factors contributed to the accident:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- The road-rail excavator joined the track between two axle counting points, which meant that the signal box did not receive any notification that the track was occupied. Consequently, the dispatcher did not see on his Iltis monitor that the track was occupied.- A section of track was partially recommissioned and then closed again within a short period of time. <p>In the implementing provisions for the works, it was mentioned that track 22 and points 12 and 13 were to be released for operation between 04:15 and 04:25 and subsequently closed again between 04:25 and 05:17. From a risk perspective, the re-commissioning of a track section for such a short period of time during works entails an increased risk of errors.</p>
Safety recommendation	<p>Target group: SBB, BLS, SOB</p> <p>In order to reduce the risks associated with recommissioning a track section in working areas to allow a train through, SBB should give preference in its work planning to operational measures, such as requiring the train to join a different track from the one in the timetable. This means that the automatic monitoring systems, which are still active, are put to the best operational use.</p>
Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation	Rapport final