



## Safety recommendation no. 136

<b>Date of the publication</b>	16.10.2018
<b>Number of the final report</b>	2018032301
<b>Safety deficit</b>	<p>On 23 March 2018, night works to dispose of cable waste were carried out on the blocked track between Grandvaux and La Conversion. A shunting movement took place at around 01:34 on the downhill stretch towards La Conversion station. This consisted of a motorised rail vehicle to which a trailer wagon loaded with cable waste was coupled. The shunting movement ran away and eventually collided with the buffer stop of track 3 in La Conversion station. The five people who were on the rail vehicle and the trailer wagon jumped off shortly before impact. One person suffered a leg injury.</p> <p>As a result of inappropriate work planning, a motorised HiA 95 rail vehicle and a trailer wagon without brakes were employed for shunting movements on a closed line, although the vehicles were not suitable for use. The motorised rail vehicle was operated by employees without appropriate training. During the shunting movement towards La Conversion station, the braking force of the motorised vehicle was not sufficient to absorb the thrust of the loaded, unbraked trailer wagon. The train ran away and stopped at the buffer stop of track 3 in La Conversion station.</p> <p>The following factors contributed to the accident:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- The information sent by e-mail concerning the use of the motorised railway vehicle, which allowed a person without minimum training under Article 10 para. 2 LDO to carry out a shunting movement on a closed line. The information provided contradicted the provisions of the Swiss transport service guidelines (FDV).</li><li>- The use of a vehicle which is not suitable and not authorised to carry out shunting movements on a closed track.</li><li>- The driver of the motorised railway vehicle had no minimum training in driving this type of vehicle or in carrying out shunting movements.</li><li>- The difficulties and uncertainties in allocating vehicles that led to the selection of the HiA 95 motorised rail vehicle to carry out this work.</li><li>- The waiver of a safety plan or a risk assessment for night work with shunting movements on a closed line.</li></ul> <p>For years, infrastructure operators have been using numerous, non-approved vehicles equipped for rail-bound driving. It is difficult to assign these vehicles to one of the service vehicle categories in accordance with RailO/IP-RailO. Improper use of such vehicles can lead to dangerous situations.</p>
<b>Safety recommendation</b>	<p>The STSB recommends that the FOT ask the infrastructure managers to draw up an inventory of non-approved rolling stock for rail-bound driving currently in their possession, classify these vehicles and then submit an application for approval of the vehicles</p>

in accordance with the FOT guideline "Railway Vehicle Approval" (Annex 4, Service Vehicles). Any restrictions on the scope of use should be indicated in the approval and an appropriate label should be affixed to the vehicle.

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<b>Addressees</b>	Bundesamt für Verkehr
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<b>Stage of the implementation</b>	Not implemented. The FOT is of the opinion that point 57.1 of the Implementing Provisions to the Railways Ordinance contains the harmonised European standards, which clearly define the various vehicles and machinery. Each of the different standards contains a diagram of its scope. Under Article 10 para. 1 of the Railways Ordinance, railway transport companies are responsible for the proper planning and construction, safe operation and maintenance of structures, installations and vehicles. Responsibility for maintaining an inventory of unauthorised vehicles lies with the infrastructure operators. Any access restrictions are listed in the operating rules. In cooperation with the infrastructure managers, it was decided to equip road-rail vehicles (SN EN 15746-x) and derailable machines (SN EN 15955) with a plate or sticker. This should list the main technical data and operational limitations.
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<b>Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation</b>	<u>Rapport final</u>
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