



## Safety recommendation no. 91

<b>Date of the publication</b>	28.04.2016
<b>Number of the final report</b>	2014122901
<b>Safety deficit</b>	<p>On 29th December 2014 in Solothurn, a shunting operation collided with a mainline locomotive standing on its destination track. The foremost wagon of the shunting operation derailed with both bogies. The mainline locomotive and the foremost wagons were severely damaged. There were no injured parties. The collision can be attributed to the fact that the foreman shunter was too late in realising that the mainline locomotive was standing on his route.</p> <p>The route to the designated destination was not clear. During shunting operations, the responsibility for ensuring safety lies almost exclusively with the shunting staff. If there is a difference between the expectation of a clear route to the designated destination and the actual situation (the wrong destination track, an obstacle on the route), the likelihood of a collision or derailment increases. The accumulation of comparable events shows that the current process does not have a sufficient effect.</p>
<b>Safety recommendation</b>	The FOT (Federal Office of Transport) should develop solutions at the levels of technology, process and people that will reduce the risk of collisions during shunting operations with a ground signal displaying 'drive with care'.
<b>Addressees</b>	Bundesamt für Verkehr
<b>Stage of the implementation</b>	<p>Implemented. The FOT states that it will carry out an in-depth analysis of the issue at the levels of technology, process and people in cooperation with the railway companies involved. The FOT would develop longterm solutions and implement the outcome point by point. However, the implementation would take some time.</p> <p>See also implementation of safety recommendation no 109.</p>
<b>Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation</b>	<a href="#">Schlussbericht</a>