



## Safety recommendation no. 13

<b>Date of the publication</b>	18.09.2018
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<b>Safety deficit</b>	<p>In Immensee, track reconstruction involving subsoil rehabilitation was taking place, for which a working composition with special vehicles was used. At about 03:45 on Wednesday, 18 March 2015, after completion of the works, the work combination was divided into two construction combinations, which were to travel independently towards Arth-Goldau. The first construction combination had to wait at the track crossover in Brunnmatt to continue its journey. At 04:27, the second construction combination was driven as an indirectly guided shunting movement into the preceding, stationary construction combination. A shunting supervisor was killed, a tracklaying worker suffered serious injuries and four tracklaying workers suffered minor injuries. Vehicles and infrastructure suffered serious damage.</p> <p>The collision between two construction compositions was due to the fact that several people in different functions did not follow rules, such as the correct application of processes for shunting movements with special vehicles, compliance with speaking rules and perception of defined roles. This led to a situation where the persons involved had different levels of knowledge and to misunderstandings about the size of the workplace, responsibilities for the route between Immensee and the Brunnmatt track crossover and therefore responsibilities for driving on the route between Immensee and the Brunnmatt track crossover.</p> <p>Contributing factors to the accident were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Discrepancies were not questioned and several people behaved without regard for safety.</li><li>- There were preexisting defects in the radio equipment of shunting supervisor 2 in terms of the sluggishness of the transmit button.</li><li>- A control tone was activated, giving the impression that the operator was still conscious or able to act.</li></ul> <p>The tasks of arranging schedules and thus determining the driving arrangements for the construction compositions were transferred to a train driver. There was no operational concept covering the operating conditions for how the construction compositions were to travel to and from the workplace, or the necessary safety measures for this.</p>
<b>Safety recommendation</b>	<p>Target group: Infrastructure companies</p> <p>The role and tasks of safety management, in particular the perception of safety responsibility in the planning and implementation of workplaces, should be reviewed. This should take account of aspects such as the burden on personnel and the monitoring of safety measures</p>
<b>Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation</b>	<u>Vorbericht</u>

## Schlussbericht