



Safety recommendation no. 143

Date of the publication	03.09.2019
Number of the final report	2019021701
Safety deficit	<p>On 17 February 2019 at 20:47 an ICE train passed over a set of points when departing from Basel Badischer Bahnhof. The front power car and the first bogie of the first carriage continued travelling along the right-hand track after the points, while the rear bogie and the rest of the train were switched to the left track. This derailed the rear bogie. The first carriage was dragged diagonally along across both tracks until the train came to a standstill approximately 20 metres in front of a tunnel wall between the two tracks. One person suffered a hand injury when attempting to stop the train with the emergency door release.</p> <p>The derailment of an ICE train when leaving Basel Badischer Bahnhof was caused by the inadvertent inadmissible emergency cancellation of its route track and the subsequent setting of another route track, which resulted in a points set being switched under the train while it was moving.</p> <p>The interlocking at Basel Badischer Bahnhof on Swiss territory has the weakness, compared to Swiss signal boxes, that after an emergency cancellation of a route track there is nothing to prevent the next immediate route block being selected. There is no requirement for this interlocking in Germany.</p> <p>The competence for laying down requirements for interlocking design rests with the German Federal Railway Authority (FRA), which under an international treaty is responsible for the safety equipment at Basel Badischer Bahnhof. The STSB cannot issue any safety recommendations to the German Federal Railway Authority.</p>
Safety recommendation	The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should bring the report and the safety advice it contains to the notice of the German Federal Railways Authority (FRA) and ask the latter for its comments on the measures envisaged.
Addressees	Bundesamt für Verkehr
Stage of the implementation	Implemented. By letter of 05 November 2019 from the FOT, the infrastructure operator Deutsche EisenbahnInfrastruktur in der Schweiz (DICH) [German Rail Infrastructure Operator in Switzerland – GIOS] and SBB Infrastructure were requested to comment on safety advice items nos. 19 and 20 in the STSB final report 2019021701. Copies of the letters were sent to the German Federal Railway Authority (FRA) in Bonn for their information. The FRA was not asked to comment.
Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation	<u>Schlussbericht</u> <u>Vorbericht</u>