



## Safety recommendation no. 119

<b>Date of the publication</b>	09.06.2017
<b>Number of the final report</b>	2016071601
<b>Safety deficit</b>	<p>On 16 July 2016 at 00:46 a shunting movement was involved in a side-on collision with a departing freight train in Chiasso Smistamento. Several wagons derailed, some of them tipped over or ended up in a tilted position. There was major material damage. No one was injured, and no dangerous goods were affected. The side-on collision can be attributed to the shunting movement travelling onto the track of the freight train. Contributing factors to the accident were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– The choice of a stopping place for turning the shunting movement that did not offer a direct view of the relevant dwarf signal.</li><li>– There were no effective track-based safety features.</li><li>– There was no effective train protection system for the shunting movement.</li><li>– There was no additional safeguard other than the regulations on the operation of shunting movements.</li></ul> <p>Shunting operations are mainly regulated through guidelines. Compliance with the guidelines depends predominantly on human performance. In many cases, track-based safety features and safety systems for the prevention of major consequences in the event of human misjudgements do not exist for shunting operations. Knowing that people make mistakes, the lack of a fall-back level for situations that occur more frequently and can have greater effects constitutes a risk to the safety of rail operations.</p>
<b>Safety recommendation</b>	<p>The FOT should examine, whether:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– The current guidelines for assessing the risks posed on railway tracks by shunting movements are sufficient.</li><li>– The companies carry out standardised recurring assessments of such situations following a change in operational processes.</li></ul>
<b>Addressees</b>	Bundesamt für Verkehr
<b>Stage of the implementation</b>	<p>Implemented. The FOT considers the existing stipulations in the implementation rules for the railways ordinance (AB-EBV) and in the safety installations compendium of the Association of Public Transport (VöV), R RTE 25053, regarding the assessment of the risks posed on railway tracks by shunting movements, whilst considering the proportionality and the Swiss transport service guidelines for operational measures, to be sufficient. Furthermore, the FOT is of the opinion that an infrastructure operator must meet the requirements of Annex II (Safety Management System – SMS) of (EU) Regulation 1169/2010 to obtain the safety permit required to build and operate railway facilities. Procedures to fulfil these requirements have to be demonstrated for the submission of the application. The associated criteria include systematic and consistent</p>

procedures for assessing the risks of changes. The consideration of operational aspects is explicitly specified. By examining these requirements, it was ensured that the companies must have relevant procedures in place. The FOT randomly checks the application of these procedures, i.e. of the change management, as part of the safety monitoring.

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**Investigation report concerning  
the safety recommendation**

Rapporto finale  
Schlussbericht

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