



Safety recommendation no. 163

Date of the publication	17.08.2021
Number of the final report	2020111601
Safety deficit	<p>On 16 November 2020 at 02:33, a collision occurred on track 3 in Cully between a train engaged in a shunting movement, coming from an SBB Infrastructure Contact Lines worksite on the open track between Lutry and Cully, and another train at a standstill on track 3. The latter was supposed to continue its journey to an SBB Infrastructure Tracks worksite in Lutry, i.e. past the Contact Lines worksite. As a result of the impact, the stationary vehicles on track 3 were pushed back 25 metres. Two people were slightly injured. The rolling stock incurred extensive damage.</p> <p>The collision on track 3 at Cully station between the Contact Lines train and the Tracks train was caused by the former travelling at a speed unadapted to the visibility conditions and the ETCS signal showing 'Proceed with caution'. The train was unable to come to a halt before reaching the stationary vehicles.</p> <p>The following contributed to the incident:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• A lack of planning and coordination in preparing the works so that there was no agreed definition of the operating restrictions to be applied when working on the same site;• Failure to hire a site coordinator;• Failure to inform staff on the ground of the operating status, which would allow them to determine unequivocally the current track occupancy. <p>According to the RTE safety regulations, the site coordinator – or the safety manager – is responsible for managing the written inspections for all shunting movements along the entire closed section. On larger worksites, it is not unusual for several trains to be involved. Distances and the local topography may prevent the site coordinator from having a visual overview of the entire area. As a result, the task of following shunting movements can become tedious and error-prone.</p> <p>Although he was in charge of safety, the Contact Lines safety manager who was on the worksite right on the track between Cully and Lutry was not aware that a train was waiting on track 3 in Cully station and that this train was then supposed to pass along the closed track on which he was working, heading for the Tracks worksite at Lutry station.</p> <p>Safety managers and site coordinators do not have the technology to check that the track restrictions confirmed by the rail traffic coordinator are indeed as requested or to determine the track status (free/occupied) when they authorise a shunting movement to operate in the closed area. This is despite the fact that IT tools currently exist to allow for such information to be made available.</p>
Safety recommendation	<p>The STSB recommends that, to ensure the safety of complex worksites, the FOT should require infrastructure managers to provide</p>

safety managers and site coordinators with a real-time graphical overview of the operating situation (in particular the status of track restrictions, track occupancy and established itineraries) for the area in which they are responsible for worksite safety.

Addressees	Bundesamt für Verkehr
Stage of the implementation	Partially implemented. The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) has defined a range of measures in its monitoring activities allowing it to ascertain in the medium term if implementation is feasible.
Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation	<u>Rapport final</u> <u>Rapport de première information</u>
