



## Safety recommendation no. 165

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| <b>Date of the publication</b>    | 07.09.2021   |
| <b>Number of the final report</b> | 2016042003   |
| <b>Safety deficit</b>             | <p>On 20 April 2016 at approx. 13:09, the motorvessel Albis (MS Albis) belonging to the Zürichsee-Schiffahrtsgesellschaft (ZSG) collided with the jetty while mooring in Küsnacht (ZH). Several people were injured in the collision. Extensive damage was caused to the ship and the jetty.</p> <p>The collision between MV Albis and the jetty in Küsnacht on 20 April 2016 can be attributed to the fact that it was not possible to take over driving control on the port bridge-wing control stand. As the records for some important parameters for the accident investigation are lacking, it cannot be said conclusively whether purely technical or purely human factors were the cause.</p> <p>The following contributed to the accident:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Unfavourable decisions and prioritisation regarding<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- the time at which the switch was made from the main bridge to the bridge-wing control stand; this left little room to deal with unforeseen events;</li><li>- rapid acceleration shortly before the mooring manoeuvre from the main control stand, considering the distance and the approach angle to the mooring jetty as well as the given topology.</li></ul></li><li>• A lack of training on dealing with possible system failures.</li><li>• Inadequate or missing guidelines, controls and monitoring in the company with regard to<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- procedures, plans and training courses which raise awareness of system failures and the emergency procedures in response to them, and which also provide regular opportunities for shipmasters to address issues relevant to the safe navigation of passenger ships;</li><li>- applying lessons learned from safety-relevant notifications.</li></ul></li></ul> <p>The following associated risks were identified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The technical limits of the steering system are not sufficiently considered in the current operating processes.</li><li>• No 'Failure/Malfunction of motor steering' scenario exists.</li><li>• There is no gathering of data that is required to analyse causes and to improve the system long-term.</li><li>• The ZSG does not have a concept for developing and monitoring a safety management system. In particular, the company does not ensure that its shipmasters read, understand and apply appropriate instructions on all lessons learned regarding the safe navigation of its vessels.</li><li>• Safety-relevant and reportable incidents are not reported to the FOT as the ZSG does not have up-to-date instructions. As a result, the FOT cannot carry out some oversight functions that are vital to safety in the system.</li></ul> |

Safety-relevant information is gathered and disseminated via various

channels. However, this information is not consistently examined to identify and evaluate possible risks. For example, technical information is published on notice boards, damage reports with important findings and instructions for action are stored in folders on the ships. No check is made as to whether shipmasters receive, understand and apply this important and elementary information, and individual levels of knowledge cannot be tracked. It is therefore impossible to recognise deficits early and make targeted corrections.

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| <b>Safety recommendation</b>                                     | The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) should require ship companies to develop and implement a safety management system. This should ensure that possible risks are identified, recorded and evaluated, and that required actions are defined and corrections are initiated. Collecting, distributing and monitoring the impact of safety-relevant information should be taken into particular account.  |
| <b>Addressees</b>  | Bundesamt für Verkehr  |
| <b>Stage of the implementation</b>                               | Partially implemented. The Federal Office of Transport (FOT) responds as follows: Since 2022, the FOT has included this issue in the monitoring programme of navigation company risk management audits.<br>The issue of 'safety culture' is currently being tested in a pilot project in the FOT's railway audits. Once this is completed and evaluated, the results will be adapted for maritime shipping and added to the navigation company risk management audits. |
| <b>Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation</b> | <u><a href="#">Vorbericht</a></u><br><u><a href="#">Schlussbericht</a></u>   |