

Swiss Confederation

Büro für Flugunfalluntersuchungen BFU
Bureau d'enquête sur les accidents d'aviation BEAA
Ufficio d'inchiesta sugli infortuni aeronautici UIIA
Uffizi d'investigaziun per accidents d'aviatica UIAA
Aircraft accident investigation bureau AAIB

Final Report No. 1899 of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

concerning the incident (Airprox)

between AFR542D and 9U-BTB
on 30 June 2004
Geneva airport

FINAL REPORT

AIR TRAFFIC INCIDENT REPORT (ATIR)

AIRPROX (NEAR MISS)

This report has been prepared solely for the purpose of accident/incident prevention. The legal assessment of accident/incident causes and circumstances is no concern of the incident investigation (Art. 24 of the Air Navigation Law). The masculine form is used in this report regardless of gender for reasons of data protection.

PLACE/DATE/TIME	Geneva airport, 30 June 2004; 16:40 UTC		
AIRCRAFT	AFR542D, Boeing 737-500, F-GJNE, Air France Paris-CDG - Geneva		
	9U-BTB, Falcon 50, state aircraft Technical flight Geneva – Geneva		
ATC UNIT	Geneva Terminal, Control Tower TWR, Aerodrome Control		
CONTROLLER	Aerodrome Controller		
AIRSPACE	D		

HISTORY

On Wednesday 30 June 2004, a private aircraft, type Gulfstream V, registration VP-KBZ, was on the ILS and was preparing to land on runway 23 at Geneva.

At 16:38, an aircraft type Boeing 737-500, commercial flight AFR542D from Paris-CDG to Geneva, called the Control Tower and reported that it was established on the runway 23 ILS. It was 11.5 NM from the threshold of runway 23.

An Airbus 320, flight SWR356E from Geneva to London Heathrow, reported that it was ready for immediate departure from runway 23, behind the landing of aircraft VP-KBZ.

The aerodrome controller asked the pilot of flight AFR542D to reduce speed to permit the Airbus 320 to take-off after the landing of aircraft VP-KBZ.

A state aircraft type Falcon 50, registration 9U-BTB, ready for a technical flight of about 40 minutes duration in the region of the Alps, was in holding bay YANKEE 2, ready for take-off from runway 23 after the YANKEE intersection.

The pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB reported on the Control Tower frequency and at 16:39:49 the aerodrome controller replied to him "... *I remind you that you are number two for departure.*"

Aircraft VP-KBZ landed and vacated the runway via taxiway CHARLIE. This access taxiway is located practically opposite the position of aircraft 9U-BTB, which was holding on taxiway YANKEE.

As soon as aircraft VP-KBZ vacated the runway, the aerodrome controller cleared the Airbus 320 SWR356E for an immediate take off, informing it of the traffic on final approach on runway 23.

The Boeing 737 AFR542D was on its final approach at a distance of 2.5 NM from the threshold of runway 23. The aerodrome controller also issued it with essential traffic information concerning the Airbus 320 on take-off.

At 16:41:13, the aerodrome controller issued a conditional departure clearance to the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB. He cleared it to line up on runway 23, at the YANKEE intersection, behind a Boeing 737 "on short".

The pilot read back this clearance, answering: "on short, we are lining up behind, Bravo Tango Bravo".

When the procedures corresponding to CAT 1 are activated, the red stop bars on intersections Y and Z are not illuminated.

Some 30 seconds later, the Airbus 320 SWR356E, in take-off phase, passed the YANKEE intersection, in front of aircraft 9U-BTB.

After it had passed, aircraft 9U-BTB lined up on runway 23 at the YANKEE intersection.

At 16:42:18, aircraft AFR542D was approximately 1 NM from the threshold of the runway at an altitude of 1700 ft and the aerodrome controller, having noticed the runway incursion by the Falcon 50, instructed the pilot to go around.

The aerodrome controller instructed the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB to maintain his position and made the following comment to him "yeah, it was behind the seven three seven which was on short, not... behind the take-off."

According to the radar recordings, aircraft AFR542D descended to 1600 ft before initiating the go-around procedure.

Aircraft 9U-BTB was cleared to take off at 16:43:28 without any comment being made to it.

Aircraft AFR542D carried out a left-hand downwind approach procedure and landed on runway 23 at 16:57.

An ATIR report was lodged by the ATC unit.

FINDINGS

- The runway in operation was runway 23.
- The aerodrome controller was in possession of the appropriate licence.
- When the procedures corresponding to CAT 1 are activated, the red stop bars of intersections Y and Z are not illuminated.
- All radio communications on the TWR frequency 118.7 MHz between the pilots of flights AFR542D, 9U-BTB and the aerodrome controller took place in French.
- According to the aerodrome controller's statement, the volume of traffic was average.
- At 16:38:03, the pilot of aircraft AFR542D, a Boeing 737-500 from Paris-CDG to Geneva, called aerodrome control on the TWR frequency 118.7 MHz. The aircraft was on the runway 23 ILS at a distance of 11.5 NM from the runway threshold.
- At 16:38:03, the aerodrome controller acknowledged the message and asked the pilot of aircraft 542D to "call back at two nautical miles".
- At 16:38:32, the aerodrome controller requested the pilot of aircraft AFR542D to reduce his speed to 160 knots to allow a departure.
- At 16:38:37, the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB, a Falcon 50 which had planned a technical flight from Geneva to Geneva on departure route MEDAM 2 ALFA, reported on the TWR frequency: "Geneva, Bravo Tango Bravo, holding point two three".
- Aircraft 9U-BTB was in holding bay YANKEE 2. The aerodrome controller acknowledged, replying: "*Nine Tango Bravo, hello"*.
- At 16:38:56, the pilot of aircraft SWR356E, an Airbus 320 from Geneva to London Heathrow, reported that it was ready for immediate take-off behind the next landing.
- At 16:39:00, the aerodrome controller cleared the pilot of aircraft SWR356E to line up behind an aircraft type Gulfstream V on short final. The pilot of aircraft SWR356E read back this clearance.
- The Gulfstream V on final was aircraft registration VP-KBZ, a private flight from EGWU to Geneva.
- At 16:39:08, the aerodrome controller cleared the pilot of aircraft VP-KBZ to land on runway 23.
- At 16:39:17, the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB called on the Control Tower frequency without getting any response.
- At 16:39:46, the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB called back on the Control Tower frequency; the aerodrome controller replied "... *I remind you that you are number two for departure.*" The pilot acknowledged reception of the message, replying: "*Tango Bravo*".

- At 16:40:36, the aerodrome controller requested the pilot of aircraft VP-KBZ to vacate the runway at the first intersection on the left, taxiway CHARLIE.

- Aircraft VP-KBZ vacated runway 23 via taxiway CHARLIE.
- At 16:40:51, the aerodrome controller cleared the pilot of aircraft SWR356E for immediate take off, informing him that there was traffic at three nautical miles on final approach on runway 23.
- All radio communications on the TWR frequency 118.7 MHz between the pilots of flights VP-KBZ, SWR353 and the aerodrome controller took place in English.
- At 16:41:07, the aerodrome controller issued traffic information to the pilot of aircraft AFR542D "an Airbus three twenty rolling" asking him to continue the approach. The pilot acknowledged the message.
- At 16:41:13, the aerodrome controller issued a conditional departure clearance to the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB: "Nine Tango Bravo, behind a seven three seven on short, line up twenty-three YANKEE behind".
- At 16:41:18, the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB read back this clearance: "on short, we are lining up behind, Bravo Tango Bravo".
- At 16:41:18, according to the radar recording, aircraft AFR542D was 2.5 NM from the threshold of runway 23.
- At 16:41:43, according to the radar recording, aircraft SWR356E crossed the YANKEE intersection in take-off phase.
- At 16:41:43, the aerodrome controller cleared the pilot of aircraft AFR542D to land on runway 23.
- At 16:41:48, the pilot of aircraft AFR542D read back this clearance. The aircraft, according to the radar recordings, was 1.75 NM from the threshold of runway 23.
- At 16:42:18, the aerodrome controller instructed the pilot of aircraft AFR542D to go around. According to the radar recording, aircraft AFR542D was at an altitude of 1700 ft and at a distance of 0.75 NM from the threshold of runway 23, flying at a speed of 127 knots. The pilot of aircraft AFR542D read back this message.
- The minimum altitude of aircraft AFR542D on the radar recording was 1600 ft.
- At 16:42:18, according to the radar recording, aircraft 9U-BTB was lined up on runway 23, near to the YANKEE intersection.
- At 16:42:26, the aerodrome controller asked the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB to maintain his position. The pilot read back this message.
- At 16:42:36, the aerodrome controller cleared the pilot of aircraft AFR542D to the Passiery DVOR at an altitude of 7000 ft.
- At 16:43:28, the aerodrome controller cleared the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB to take off from runway 23, at the YANKEE intersection.
- According to his report, the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB stated that he had understood that he was cleared to line up after the second aircraft landing. When he saw a second aircraft pass him, he lined up and realised too late that this aircraft was taking off.

- According to the report of the Air France company, the pilot of aircraft AFR542D stated that when the aircraft had entered the runway he had received the go-around instruction at a height of approximately 600/700 ft/ground in excellent meteorological conditions.

- In his statement, the aerodrome controller stated: "There was sustained traffic that day, so having to repeat an instruction several times to a pilot wastes a lot of our time (given that we have to handle several things at once). There are priorities to be complied with for aircraft landing and taking off. That's why I didn't correct the pilot about his bad read-back."
- Weather: QAM LSGG 1620Z 30.06.2004

230 DEG 11 KT CAVOK +31/+08 QNH 1016 ONE SIX QFE THR 23 967 QFE THR 05 965 NOSIG

ANALYSIS

Aircraft Falcon 50, 9U-BTB

In his incident report, the commander stated: "We were at holding point Y2, ready to line up on runway 23. We received clearance from the controller to line up after the second aircraft landing. The first aircraft passed us and vacated the runway to go to the main parking area. We were expecting to make a rolling take-off and, when we saw a second aircraft pass by us, we lined up on the runway; but unfortunately this aircraft was taking off. This is why aircraft AFR542D, which was on final approach, went around. We regretted this confusion which caused this incident and trust we have your understanding."

At 16:39:46, when the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB called the Tower, the aerodrome controller replied "... *I remind you that you are number two for departure.*" The pilot acknowledged this message, replying: "*Tango Bravo*".

According to his statements, the pilot confused the aerodrome controller's message which informed him of the position he occupied in the departure sequence with a conditional line-up clearance for a departure after the second aircraft.

The pilot successively observed the arrival and runway vacation of the Gulfstream 5 aircraft, VP-KBZ, then the take-off phase of the Airbus 320, SWR356E. These two events took place in front of him, opposite his position on taxiway YANKEE.

At 16:41:13, the aerodrome controller issued a conditional departure clearance to the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB: "Nine Tango Bravo, behind a seven three seven on short, line up twenty-three YANKEE behind". The pilot read back this clearance succinctly: "on short, we are lining up behind, Bravo Tango Bravo".

This read-back did not comply with the rigorous recommendations for a conditional clearance, i.e. the clear and accurate repetition of the received instructions in order to indicate that they have been understood and will be complied with.

According to his statements, the pilot observed the passage of the Airbus 320 and then lined up on runway 23, thinking he was obeying the instruction he had received.

Although the aerodrome controller mentioned the aircraft type behind which he was cleared to line up, the pilot's attention was not drawn to this detail. The term "on short", truncated from the term "final", should also have drawn his attention to the position of the indicated aircraft.

Clearly, the pilot did not attentively monitor the evolution of the traffic, nor did he visually verify the final approach line before lining up.

Aircraft Boeing 737-500, AFR542D

In his incident report, the aircraft's commander stated: "The go-around was in fact caused by traffic lining up which had not complied with the line-up clearance behind our landing.

Excellent meteorological conditions, runway 23 in service, left-hand circuit then landing. Several incoming traffic and I believe we were the last in the sequence.

One traffic stated it was ready for take-off and the controller asked it to line up behind a B737 which was landing. I don't know if the traffic preceding us was a B373 or if the departing traffic may have mistaken one aircraft for another?

Arriving at around 700/600 ft/ground, the aircraft was committed and the controller simultaneously instructed us to go around."

According to the radar recording, when the aerodrome controller instructed the pilot of aircraft AFR542D to go around, aircraft AFR542D was at altitude 1700 ft, i.e. at a height of 289 ft in relation to the airport reference point at a distance of 0.75 NM from the threshold of runway 23.

Aerodrome control

The aerodrome controller issued a conditional clearance to the pilot of aircraft 9U-BTB in the following form: "Nine Tango Bravo, behind a seven three seven on short, line up twenty-three YANKEE behind".

The only difference with the phraseology specific to this type of clearance concerns the term "on short" which would have been more correct if followed by the term "final", in accordance with the standard phraseology.

The pilot read back this clearance succinctly: "on short, we are lining up behind, Bravo Tango Bravo".

This read-back was too concise to indicate clearly that the received instructions were understood and the aerodrome controller should have asked for a read-back in accordance with conditional clearances.

The traffic situation at the time was not appropriate for the use of a conditional clearance.

The aerodrome controller gave the go-around instruction to the pilot of aircraft AFR542D 35 seconds after issuing the landing clearance to him, when he realised that the runway was obstructed as a result of the incursion of the Falcon 50.

Conditional clearances

Reference: OACI Doc. 4444 ATM/501 § 4.5.7.5.1.1./4.5.7.5.2.

Other clearances or instructions, including conditional clearances, will be read back or acknowledged in a manner which clearly indicates that they have been understood and that they will be carried out.

The controller shall listen to the read-back to assure himself that the flight crew have indeed received and understood the clearance or instruction, and he shall intervene immediately to correct any disparity which might be revealed by the read-back.

Reference ATM Switzerland, Section 5 Radiotelephony procedures § 5-18.1

The following items must be read back by pilots:

...

Other clearances or instructions, including conditional clearances, shall be read back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been understood and will be complied with.

Strictly adhere to read-back requirements. Request a read-back from a pilot if he does not read back on his own initiative. If, in checking the correctness of a read-back, you notice incorrect items, transmit the words "NEGATIVE I SAY AGAIN" at the conclusion of the read-back followed by the correct version of the items concerned.

Reference ICAO DOC 9432-AN/925 Manual of Radiotelephony Chapter 4

Conditional clearances shall not be used for movements affecting the active runway(s), except when the aircraft or vehicles concerned are seen by both the controller and pilot. When the conditional clearance involves a departing aircraft and an arriving aircraft it is important that the departing aircraft correctly identifies the arriving aircraft on which the conditional clearance is based. Reference to the arriving aircraft type may be insufficient and it may be necessary to add a description of the colour or the company name to ensure correct identification.

A conditional clearance shall be given as follows:

- a) call sign;
- b) the condition;
- c) the clearance.

CAUSE

Incursion onto runway 23 from an intersection by an aircraft following a misunderstanding by its crew. This error is consecutive to the use of an incomplete conditional line-up clearance.

Factor which may have played a part in the incident:

The fact that the stop bars do not systematically delimit all the holding positions "before the runway" (runway holding positions).

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

Safety deficit

An aircraft crew in a holding position at a runway 23 intersection at Geneva airport received conditional clearance to line up behind an aircraft on final. Following a misunderstanding, the aircraft entered the runway in front of the indicated traffic.

Safety recommendation No. 358

Within the framework of an investigation into a serious incident between an aircraft of the Lufthansa company (DLH3703) and one of the KLM company (KLM 1931), the report of which was published on 12 May 2005, the AAIB had issued the following safety recommendation:

The Federal Office for Civil Aviation should require that all intersections and starts of runways be equipped with stop bars and that the latter be activated under all meteorological conditions during the airport's hours of activity.

Berne, 23 March 2006

Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

This report has been prepared solely for the purpose of accident/incident prevention. The legal assessment of accident/incident causes and circumstances is no concern of the incident investigation (Art. 24 of the Air Navigation Law). The masculine form is used in this report regardless of gender for reasons of data protection.



TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONY

OR RADIOTELEPHONY COMMUNICATION TAPE-RECORDINGS

Investigation into the incident that occured on 30.06.2004

- Subject of transcript: 9UBTB / AFR542D

- Centre concerned: Swiss Radar Area West

- Designation of unit: Terminal Control Geneva, Aerodrome Control

- Frequency / Channel: 118.7 MHz

- Date and period (UTC) covered by attached extract: 30.06.2004

16:38 - 16:44 UTC

- Date of transcript: 14 July 2004

- Name of official in charge of transcription: Ivan ROCHAT

- Certificate by official in charge of transcription:

I hereby certify:

- That the accompanying transcript of the telephony or radiotelephony communication tape-recordings, retained at the present time in the premises of the Analysis Department, has been made, examined and checked by me.
- That no changes have been made to the entries in columns 2, 3 and 4, which contain only clearly understood indications in their original form.

Geneva, 14 July 2004

Ivan ROCHAT



Abbreviations

Sector Designation of sector

TWR - Swiss Radar Area West, Terminal Control Geneva, Aerodrome Control

<u>Aircraft</u>	-	<u>Callsign</u>	Type of acft	Flight rules	<u>ADEP</u>	-	<u>ADES</u>
542D	-	Air France 542D	B735	IFR	LFPG	-	LSGG
2739	-	Speedbird 2739	B734	IFR	LSGG	-	EGKK
807	-	Star Wing 807	AT43	IFR	EDDK	-	LSGG
9TB	-	9UBTB	FA50	IFR	LSGG	-	LSGG
356E	-	Swiss 356E	A320	IFR	LSGG	-	EGLL
VKZ	-	V - PBKZ	GLF5	IFR	EGWU	-	LSGG
501	-	Star-Jet 501	F900	IFR	LETO	-	LSGG
PSA	-	PH - RSA	C56X	IFR	LSGG	-	LFPB
HKH	_	HB - CKH	C210	VFR	LSGG	-	????

OGEY / 14 July 2004

Occurrence: 9UBTB / AFR542D of 30.06.2004



To From Time Communications Observations

<u>Col.1</u> <u>Col.2</u> <u>Col.3</u> <u>Col.4</u> <u>Col.5</u>

Frequency: 118.7 MHz, Geneva Tower

TWR	542D	16:38:03	La Tour, bonjour, Air France cinq cent quarante-deux Delta, en final vingt-trois.	
542D	TWR	08	Air France cinq cent quarante-deux Delta, bonjour, compris, rappelez deux nautiques.	
TWR	542D	12	Cinq quarante-deux Delta.	
2739	TWR	13	Speedbird two seven three nine, wind two two zero degrees, niner knots, runway two three, cleared take-off.	
TWR	2739	18	Cleared take-off, Speedbird two seven three nine.	
807	TWR	20	Star Wing eight zero seven, Apron, one two one seven five, goodbye.	
TWR	807	23	Apron, one two one seven five, Star Wing eight zero seven, goodbye.	
542D	TWR	27	Air France cinq cent quarante-deux Delta, votre vitesse?	
TWR	542D	29	Cent quatre-vingts nœuds, on nous a demandé de maintenir jusqu'à six.	
542D	TWR	32	D'accord, réduisez vers cent soixante nœuds pour permettre un départ.	
TWR	542D	34	Cent soixante nœuds, ????? cinq cent quarante-deux Delta.	Unreadable
TWR	9TB	37	Genève, Bravo Tango Bravo, point d'attente deux trois.	
9 <i>TB</i>	TWR	46	Neuf Tango Bravo, bonjour.	
TWR	9 <i>TB</i>	47	????? Tour, neuf Uniforme Bravo Tango Bravo?	Unreadable due two stations
				No reply
TWR	356E	56	????? ready for immediate behind next landing, Swiss three five six Echo.	
356E	TWR	16:39:00	Three five six Echo, behind Gulfstream five on short, line up runway two three behind.	



To <u>Col.1</u>	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
TWR	356E	16:39:04	Behind the traffic on final, lining up two three behind, Swiss three five six Echo.	
VKZ	TWR	08	Victor Kilo Zulu, runway two three, clear to land, two three zero degrees, ten knots.	
TWR	VKZ	11	XXXXX, Victor Kilo Zulu.	Probably "Clear to land two three"
TWR	9TB	17	Et Genève Tour, neuf Uniform Bravo Tango Bravo?	No reply
2739	TWR	36	Speedbird two seven three nine, contact Departure, one two one decimal three, goodbye.	
TWR	2739	40	One two one three, goodbye, Speedbird two seven three nine.	
TWR	9TB	46	Et Genève Tour, neuf Uniform Bravo Tango Bravo.	
9TB	TWR	49	?????, je vous ai déjà dit bonjour, je vous rappelle, vous êtes numéro deux pour le départ.	Unreadable
TWR	9 <i>TB</i>	52	Tango Bravo.	
TWR	501	55	????? Tower, Star-Jet five zero one, bonjour, established on final.	Unreadable
501	TWR	16:40:00	Star-Jet five zero one, bonjour, roger, report two miles.	
TWR	501	06	I report you two miles on final, Star-Jet five zero one.	
TWR	PSA	22	Tower, bonsoir, Papa Hotel Romeo Sierra Alfa, in holding bay Yankee two, ready for departure.	
PSA	TWR	27	Papa Sierra Alfa, bonjour, number three for departure.	
TWR	PSA	29	XXXXX.	Microphone noise
VKZ	TWR	36	Victor Kilo Zulu, vacate via Charlie, first left, please.	
TWR	VKZ	39	First left, Charlie, Victor Kilo Zulu.	
356E	TWR	51	Swiss three five six Echo, wind two three zero degrees, ten knots, runway two three, cleared take-off, no delay, inbound traffic three miles.	
TWR	356E	58	Roger, rolling two three, cleared take-off, Swiss three five six Echo.	



To <u>Col.1</u>	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
VKZ	TWR	16:41:02	Victor Kilo Zulu, contact Apron, one two one seven five, bye-bye.	
TWR	VKZ	05	One two one seven five, Victor Kilo Zulu, good day.	
542D	TWR	07	Air France cinq cent quarante-deux Delta, poursuivez l'approche, un Airbus trois vingt au roulage.	
TWR	542D	12	On poursuit, cinq quarante-deux Delta.	
9TB	TWR	13	Neuf Tango Bravo, derrière un sept trente-sept en courte, alignez-vous vingt-trois <u>Yankee</u> derrière.	
TWR	9 <i>TB</i>	18	En courte on s'aligne derrière, Bravo Tango Bravo.	
542D	TWR	43	Air France cinq cent quarante-deux Delta, autorisez atterrissage vingt-trois, deux cent trente degrés, dix nœuds.	
TWR	542D	48	Autorisé atterrissage vingt-trois, cinq quarante-deux Delta.	
542D	TWR	16:42:18	France cinq cent quarante-deux Delta, remettez les gaz, je répète, remettez les gaz, le vent deux cent trente degrés, dix nœuds.	
TWR	542D	22	Remise de gaz, cinq quarante-deux Delta.	
9TB	TWR	26	Neuf Tango Bravo, vous maintenez position.	
TWR	9TB	28	On maintient position, Bravo Tango Bravo.	
9TB	TWR	30	Ouais, c'était derrière le sept trente-sept qui était en courte, pas derrière le décollage.	
TWR	9TB	35	Merci.	
542D	TWR	36	Air France cinq quarante-deux Delta, faites route Passeiry, sept mille pieds, le QNH mille seize.	
TWR	542D	41	Passeiry, sept mille, mille seize, cinq quarante-deux Delta.	
542D	TWR	43	Et je suis désolé pour ça.	
TWR	542D	45	C'est pas grave, ça arrive.	



To <u>Col.1</u>	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
542D	TWR	16:43:06	Et Air France cinq cent quarante-deux Delta, contactez l'Arrivée, cent trente et un trente-deux.	
TWR	542D	09	Cent vingt et un trente-deux, à tout à l'heure	
542D	TWR	11	?????.	Unreadable
TWR	356E	24	Out of five, Swiss three five six Echo.	
356E	TWR	26	I call you back shortly.	
9 <i>TB</i>	TWR	28	Neuf Tango Bravo, le vent deux cent quarante degrés, dix noeuds, autorisez décollage vingt-trois depuis Yankee.	
TWR	9 <i>TB</i>	33	Décollage, Bravo Tango Bravo.	
356E	TWR	35	Swiss three five six Echo, contact Departure, one two one three, goodbye.	
TWR	356E	39	XXXXX.	Probably "Goodbye"
501	TWR	42	Star-Jet five zero one, continue approach, wind two four zero degrees, niner knots.	
TWR	501	46	We continue approach, two miles on final, five zero one.	
TWR	542D	16:44:03	La Tour, Air France cinq quarante-deux Delta, vous confirmez trente et un trente-deux pour la suite?	
542D	TWR	06	Oui, stoppez la montée vers cinq mille pieds initialement.	
TWR	542D	09	Cinq mille, et donc on passe avec trente et un trente- deux	
542D	TWR	11	Pardon, c'est mon erreur, cent trente-six vingt-cinq, excusez-moi.	
TWR	542D	14	Trente-six vingt-cinq, okay, à tout à l'heure.	
TWR	НКН	20	Genève Tour, Hotel bravo Charlie Kilo Hotel, bonsoir, holding bay, heu, point d'attente vingt-trois gazon, prêt pour le départ, sortie Sierra ou Sierra Echo.	
HKH	TWR	29	Bonsoir, compris, je vous rappelle.	
TWR	HKH	31	Merci, Hotel Kilo Hotel.	



To	From	Time	Communications	Observations
<u>Col.1</u>	<u>Col.2</u>	Col.3	<u>Col.4</u>	Col.5
501	TWR	16:44:33	Star-Jet five zero one, cleared to land two three, two four zero degrees, niner knots.	Two stations
TWR	???	35	?????, holding point two three, ready for departure.	Unreadable due two stations
501	TWR	39	Star-Jet five zero one, cleared to land two three, two four zero degrees, niner knots.	
TWR	501	42	Clear to land runway two three, XXXXX five zero one.	Probably "Star-Jet"
9TB	TWR	44	Neuf Tango Bravo, contactez le Départ, cent vingt et un trois.	
TWR	9 <i>TB</i>	47	????? trois, Bravo Tango Bravo.	Unreadable



