Safety recommendation no. 7

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Safety deficit	The aircraft was equipped with a ballistic parachute system (ballistic rescue system with rocket propellant, hereafter referred to as BPS). This system was not activated prior to or as a result of the impact. The cover on the BPS's firing aperture was intact, still sealing the BPS's firing aperture mounted into the deck of the fuselage. During the intervention from the emergency responders and emergency services, there were people in the danger area (blast radius) of the BPS on a number of occasions. Over the course of the work on the accident site, a splint was fitted on the BPS release handle in the cockpit by a local aircraft mechanic to ensure that the BPS was not unintentionally activated via the release handle. However, as damage to the structure in the area of the BPS was likely, sudden activation of the BPS during the investigation at the accident site and the subsequent recovery could not be ruled out.
Safety recommendation	If a ballistic parachute system (ballistic recovery system with rocket propellant) is not activated during an aircraft accident, one has to assume a threat to the emergency services from the ballistic parachute system – the ballistic parachute system can be activated by working on the wreckage even when the release mechanism in the cockpit is secured. If an unreleased ballistic parachute system is identified at an accident site, it is prudent to mark the blast radius of the ballistic parachute system in addition to the general cordoning-off of the accident site. It is recommended to cordon off a funnel-shaped area at an angle of about 60° and a distance of 100 metres from the firing aperture in the direction of the blast using barrier tape or cones. Entry into this sector should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. Survivors should be removed from the danger zone as quickly as possible. If possible and necessary for the safety of rescue operations, measures should be adopted as described in STSB's safety recommendation no. 454. Primarily, this includes blocking the release cable as close to the igniter unit as possible. This can be done using crimping pliers, for example, by crimping the release cable to the cable sheath as close as possible to the rocket and without displacing the cable in its cover and therefore blocking it.
Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation	Schlussbericht

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