



Safety recommendation no. 462

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Safety deficit	<p>Air traffic control cleared the crew of a flight to descend to a lower flight level. At the same time, a different flight level was entered into the system by air traffic control. The crew correctly entered the clearance they had been given into their system and the flight was transferred to the next area control center where they were expected at a different flight level. As a result, a dangerous convergence occurred with another flight.</p> <p>Both aircraft were equipped with a transponder, which transmitted the flight level set in the aircraft's system to the radar stations. However, for technical reasons this data cannot currently be used by Swiss air traffic control to trigger an alert in the event of any discrepancy.</p>
Safety recommendation	<p>The Federal Office of Civil Aviation should ensure that within Swiss air traffic control a system is implemented which is able, in the event of a discrepancy between the air traffic control altitude clearance (cleared flight level) and the setting in the aircraft (selected altitude), to trigger an alarm.</p>
Addressees	BAZL Bundesamt für Zivilluftfahrt
Stage of the implementation	<p>Implemented. In December 2013, Skyguide commissioned the enhanced surveillance cleared level adherence (EHS CLAM) function in the Zurich and Geneva area control centers (ACC), thereby implementing the safety recommendation. This modification was part of a "common controller cockpit" Skyguide program and was tested and approved by the Federal Office of Civil Aviation before introduction.</p>
Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation	<p>Final report <u>Schlussbericht</u></p>