



## Safety recommendation no. 437

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<b>Safety deficit</b>	<p>On the morning of June 7, 2010, the Diamond DA 40 HB-SGE aircraft took off on a training flight in accordance with Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) on runway 28 in St. Gallen-Altenrhein. The air traffic controller (ATCO) initially instructed the crew to maintain runway heading due to an IFR flight. Shortly after take-off, the crew was requested to turn left to the ZULU exit point. The crew confirmed this instruction.</p> <p>The Piper PA-46-500TP 'Meridian' D-FRAH was on an IFR flight from Grenchen to St. Gallen-Altenrhein. Shortly after entering the control zone, the pilot reported on the frequency of St. Gallen Tower. The aircraft was aligned with the instrument landing system (ILS) on runway 10. When the two aircraft had approached to a distance of 1 NM, the ATCO noticed on his radar display that the HB-SGE was still on the basic approach line of the ILS. He instructed the HB-SGE to turn left immediately and informed them of the oncoming aircraft. Both crews reported visual contact with the other aircraft. The aircraft crossed in opposite directions with an altitude difference of 300 ft.</p> <p>The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau concluded that there were safety deficiencies with regard to IFR approaches to runway 10 and simultaneous VFR departures from runway 28 due to the combination of the following factors:</p> <p>The conditions for the occurrence of the serious incident were created by an operating concept based on an intergovernmental agreement, which results in aircraft landing on runway 10 and departing from runway 28 at St. Gallen-Altenrhein. Even if the present procedure is understandable for noise and environmental protection reasons, it is not in line with best practice in aviation to disentangle the flight paths of arriving and departing aircraft and poses considerable systemic risks from a flight safety perspective.</p> <p>The serious incident occurred in a control zone of airspace class D, in which IFR traffic is not separated from VFR traffic, but only receives traffic information.</p> <p>A radar display (tower air situation display) is available in the air traffic control center at St. Gallen-Altenrhein Airport, which allows the distance of an aircraft approaching on runway 10 to the runway threshold to be determined. This gives the air traffic controller a limited overview of the traffic situation in the approach sector of runway 10.</p> <p>The air traffic controller's instruction to the crew of the aircraft departing from runway 28 to maintain the runway direction after take-off constituted an attempt to influence the flight path of this</p>

aircraft. In doing so, he relied on the tower air situation display, which was inadequate for this purpose.

Despite the traffic information transmitted by the air traffic controller to both aircraft, which resulted in mutual visual contact, an airprox occurred.

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**Safety recommendation**

The Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FOCA), together with the operator of St. Gallen-Altenrhein Airport and Skyguide, should take technical or operational measures to reduce the risks associated with an IFR approach to runway 10 and simultaneous VFR departures from runway 28.

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**Investigation report concerning the safety recommendation**

Schlussbericht

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